On March 18 2014, Russia, under the
direction of President Vladimir Putin, annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of
Crimea. (Myers, Barry, 2014) When the
facts surrounding the annexation are examined, not only do Putin’s motivations
remain relatively unclear, but also his philosophy on foreign policy is left
open for interpretation. Based on his
actions in Crimea, does Vladimir Putin make decisions from the perspective of realpolitik,
liberal internationalism, or constructivist foreign policy?
To adequately evaluate Putin’s
foreign policy in terms of his engagements in Crimea, what Russia had to gain
and lose from those engagements must first be considered. In terms of gains, an annexation of Crimea could
potentially provide Russia with a valuable tourist destination and resort
location. The Black Sea beaches and
other amenities of Crimea attracted more than 5.9 million tourists in 2013.
(Rudenko 2014) Another Russian territory
in Eastern Europe could also increase Russia’s influence in Europe as a whole. Likewise, Russia annexing Crimea shows the
European Union and its allies that Putin has no respect for international rules
of engagement and that Russia’s actions cannot be easily predicted.
However, for every modest gain
there seemed to be a fairly measurable loss.
Since Crimea’s annexation, the peninsula has attracted far fewer tourists
than in previous years due to a Ukrainian boycott of the region and few
feasible transportation methods available for Russians willing to make the
trip. (Rudenko 2014) Crimea also
receives approximately 80% of its water and 90% of its electricity from
Ukraine, meaning Russia will need to compensate Ukraine for its utilities while
spending even more money connecting Crimea to mainland Russia. (Winning, De
Carbonnel, 2014) Despite the fact
Russia’s influence in the region over the very long term may increase with the
annexation of Crimea, in the short term Russia has alienated itself from the
powerful international discussions it fought so hard in which to be included. This can be evidenced by Russia’s banishment
from the G8, now G7, coalition. (Pace 2014)
So where do the gains and losses
absorbed by Russia from annexing Crimea leave President Vladimir Putin’s
philosophy on foreign policy in terms of the three main international relations
theories?
If Putin were a liberal
internationalist, he would have failed miserably to carry out the foreign
policy’s tenets. In no way has Putin
spread liberal ideas for peace and prosperity by negotiating through
institutions. Putin did the very
opposite by completely forgoing any negotiation and simply relocating forces to
support the Russian rebels in Crimea.
Putin only created conflict and destabilized the region while banishing
his state from global institutions.
If Putin practiced Realpolitik, he
would be largely interested in Russia’s national interest and security. In other words, is Russia more powerful, from
a realist perspective, as a state before or after annexing Crimea? In the short term, Russia has damaged its
economic power by incurring massive expenses with few immediate returns on
investment. However, in the long term,
Crimea provides Putin and Russia with a valuable territory on the Black Sea, a
potential buffer zone between Ukraine and mainland Russia, and a likely profitable
tourist attraction for Russian citizens once transportation to the peninsula is
made more convenient. Militarily, Putin
didn’t have to commit large assets to Crimea because of the considerable
support for Russia already present in the region. Russia has gained access to a peninsula that
can be used for naval purposes and a long-term economic asset without any
significant military loss.
Could Putin be a foreign policy
constructivist? He certainly does not
value international organizations as influential actors on the world stage. Conversely, Putin has proven he believes societal
circumstances have changed internationally and thusly his responses to laws set
into place under past circumstances should change accordingly.
Putin is most definitely not a liberal
internationalist. However, he shares
some characteristics with both constructivist foreign policy and
realpolitik. Based on his actions in
Crimea, Putin likely makes his foreign policy decisions as a realist
constructivist. His stated motivations
for annexing Crimea consisted of bringing a people back to Russia that had
always identified themselves as Russian.
He viewed the west, mainly NATO and EU states, as the other and Russia
as the self. (Myers, Barry, 2014)
Considering the annexation of Crimea, Vladimir Putin is a constructivist
realist in terms of foreign policy.
Myers, S., & Barry, E. (2014, March 18). Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West. Retrieved September 28, 2014.
Pace, J. (2014, March 24). G8 Summit In Sochi Canceled, G7 Leaders To Meet In Brussels Instead. Retrieved September 28, 2014.
Rudenko, O. (2014, August 25). Tourism suffers in Crimea as Ukraine shuns breakaway region. Retrieved September 28, 2014.
Winning, A., & De Carbonnel, A. (2014, June 5). Russia faces struggle to wean Crimea economy off Ukraine supplies. Retrieved September 28, 2014.
Apologies for the smaller font in the last paragraph. It doesn't appear that way in the text box when I'm typing it but somehow shows up that way on the blog. I attempted to fix it but failed. Hope no one has to strain their eyes.
ReplyDeleteThe people of the Crimean province were jubilant to becoming apart of Russia instead of Ukraine, they claim that Putin liberated Crimea from the evil hand of the Ukraine government without firing a single shot. Doesn't this make Putin a liberalist?
ReplyDeleteWhile becoming a part of Russia may seem rational to the people of Crimea with Russian leanings, it is irrational from the perspective of Russia as a state to invest in a territory with such little immediate return on investment and high potential costs.
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